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SUPREME 

COURT WATCH 

By Reginald C. Oh 
In its 2004-05 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a constitutional challenge to the State ofCalifornia's practice of temporarily racially segregating its prisoners. On No­
vember 2, 2004, the Court heard oral arguments in Johnson v. 
California, No. 03-636, a lawsuit brought by an African­
American prison inmate in the California Department of 
Corrections. The petitioner contends that the state's long­
standing policy ofracially segregating prisoners for sixty days 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. On February 23, 2005, 
the Court issued its opinion in]ohnson v. California, 125 S. 
Ct. 1141 (2005), and held that the policy of racially segre­
gating prisoners must be subject to strict scrutiny. 
The petitioner, Garrison Johnson, is an African-American 
prisoner currently serving his prison term for murder, robbery, 
and assault with a deadly weapon. He entered the California 
Institute for Men in Chino, California, on June 22, 1987. 
Upon a prisoner's arrival at a corrections facility, it is the policy 
ofthe CDC to initially house the prisoner in a reception cen­
ter for sixty days, where he undergoes various physical, mental, 
and emotional evaluations. All inmates, including both new 
inmates and inmates transferring from another CDC prison 
facility, are initially housed in the reception center. 
Johnson's equal protection claim focused on the CDC's 
policy of taking race into account when determining dou­
ble-cell placements at the reception center. Each inmate is as­
signed a cellmate, and the CDC takes into consideration var­
ious factors in assigning an inmate's cellmate. One of those 
factors is the race ofthe prisoners, and the state concedes that 
race is a dominant factor in double-cell placement decisions. 
The CDC categorizes inmates into four general racial cate­
gories-black, white, Asian, and other-and all prisoners are 
assigned a cellmate ofhis own race. 
The petitioner in this case had been through several in­
mate reception centers in the CDC system, and at each fa­
cility, he was initially assigned an African-American cell­
mate. He brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
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Central District ofCalifornia, challenging the racial assign­
ment policy as a violation ofhis equal protection. The dis­
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the CDC 
administrators, concluding that they were entitled to quali­
fied immunity because their actions clearly did not violate a 
constitutional right. The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals af­
firmed the district court ruling.Johnson v. California, 321 
F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner then appealed the Ninth 
Circuit ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A central issue in this case is the question regarding the ap­
propriate standard ofreview. Under equal protection law, typ­
ically, laws that classify on the basis ofrace are subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny. Laws that employ racial classifications are 
treated as presumptively unconstitutional, and such laws will 
survive strict scrutiny only if the state can put forth a com­
pelling state interest in discriminating on the basis ofrace and 
ifthe racial classification is necessary to serve that compelling 
state interest. Historically, under strict scrutiny review, the 
Court has struck down laws that discriminated on the basis 
ofrace, holding that in each case, the government has failed to 
meet its heavy burden ofjustifying racial discrimination. 
Injohnson, however, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding the 
constitutionality ofCalifornia's policy ofracially segregating 
prison inmates, did not use the strict scrutiny standard ofre­
view. Instead, it relied on the Turner test developed by the 
Supreme Court to analyze constitutional claims in the prison 
context. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In Turner, 
the Court adopted a deferential standard of review for ana­
lyzing constitutional challenges brought by prisoners. To de­
termine if a prison regulation violates an inmate's constitu­
tional rights, the Court ruled that a regulation will be valid if 
it is reasonably related to serving legitimate penological in­
terests. Id at 89. 
Under the Turner test, four factors are analyzed to deter­
mine the constitutionality ofa prison regulation. "First, there 
must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regu­
lation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to 
justify it." Id. Second, there must be "alternative means ofex­
ercising the right that remains open to prison inmates." Id. at 
90. Third, a court must assess "the impact accommodation of 
the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other 
inmates, and on the allocation ofprison resources generally. 
Id. Finally, a court must determine ifthe prison had alternatives 
for achieving the same end. "The absence ofready alternatives 
is evidence ofthe reasonableness ofa prison regulation." Id. 
In applying the four-part Turner test to the facts in]ohn­
son, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the temporary racial 
segregation of inmates in reception centers did not violate 
equal protection. First, the court held that there is a valid, ra­
tional connection between the regulation and the govern­
ment's legitimate interest, concluding that racial segregation 
ofinmates is rationally related to furthering the state's inter-
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est in protecting the safety of inmates and staff Both sides 
agreed that inmate violence along racial lines was a serious 
and legitimate concern, and that court reasoned that tempo­
rary racial segregation of inmates was related to reducing 
racial violence and maintaining a safe prison environment. 
Second, the court held that inmates had alternative means 
of exercising their constitutional rights. The policy only re­
quired segregation ofinmates for sixty days during their stay 
in the reception center. After the sixty day period is up, inmates 
are then assigned cellmates in a racially neutral manner. Thus, 
the court concluded that overall, inmates could exercise their 
right to be free from race conscious decision-making while an 
inmate in the California prison system. 
Third, the court assessed the impact ofplaintiff's request­
ed accommodation, and held that "failing to consider race in 
making initial housing assignments would lead to increased 
racial violence both in the cells and in the common areas." Fi­
nally, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that 
there were any reasonable alternatives to deal with the problem 
ofracial violence between inmates. In holding that the CDC's 
policy does not violate equal protection, the court asserted that 
the Turner test requires that the state be given great deference 
in how it regulates its prisons and its inmates. The court inter­
preted Turner as having "lowered the prison administrators' 
burden to justify race-based policies." 321 F. 3d at 798. 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit decision, holding that the Turner test is inapplicable 
in determining the constitutionality ofracial segregation in 
prisons.Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1148--49. Instead, the Court re­
iterated the principle that all racial classifications must be 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny, even racial classifications 
used in the prison context. Id. at 1148. The Court, however, 
determined the appropriate standard ofreview, but it did not 
decide the ultimate question regarding the constitutionality 
ofCalifornia's policy of racial segregation, leaving that deci­
sion for the lower courts. 
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the majority, 
while Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in which Justice Scalia 
joined.Justice Thomas would have applied the Turner test 
and would have upheld California's policy ofracial segrega­
tion. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the 
majority did not go far enough and that it should have ruled 
that the policy is unconstitutional instead of remanding the 
case to the lower courts. 
In holding that the proper standard of review is strict 
scrutiny, the Court reasoned that applying the deferential 
Turner test to an equal protection challenge to the govern­
ment's practice of racial segregation is inconsistent with the 
Court's recent equal protection rulings in which it has em­
phatically declared that there are very few contexts in which 
de jure racial discrimination and segregation can ever be jus­
tified. Id at 1146. In Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), 
for example, the Court upheld race-conscious affirmative ac­
tion programs, but in doing so, it reaffirmed that even "be­
nign'' racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny, 
and it strongly hinted that it would permit the use ofaffirma­
tive action programs for only twenty-five more years. 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that upholding govern­
ment sponsored racial segregation in the prison context 
would conflict with the view that governmental reliance on 
racial classifications makes it harder to achieve a color-blind 
society in which race truly becomes a morally irrelevant factor 
in governmental and private decision-making. See id. at 1147. 
The Court reasoned that the State ofCalifornia's reliance on 
racial segregation as a tool for prison management may end 
up reinforcing racial divisions, racial stereotypes, and inter­
racial conflicts, and thus contribute to the very racial violence 
that it is purportedly seeking to prevent through its policy. Id. 
However, while the Court made it clear what standard of 
review must apply to determine the constitutionality ofracial 
segregation in prisons, in Johnson, the Court declined to 
apply strict scrutiny to the facts of the case, and instead, re­
manded the case for either the district court or the court of 
appeals to determine whether California's policy meets the 
strict scrutiny test. 
Thus, even after the Court's decision in]ohnson, a critical 
question remains unanswered: does racial segregation in pris­
ons violate the Equal Protection Clause? There is a strong 
possibility that the lower court may uphold the practice of 
racial segregation even under strict scrutiny analysis. Clearly, 
the state has a compelling interest in preserving safety and in 
preventing racial violence in prisons. The critical question on 
remand, therefore, will be whether the temporary racial seg­
regation ofall inmates entering the reception center is nar­
rowly tailored or necessary to further the state's compelling 
interest. Ifthe court accepts the contention that racial segre­
gation may sometimes be necessary to reduce racial violence 
in prisons, the court would be hard pressed to deny the state 
an effective tool in preventing death and injury to inmates 
and prison staff Given the strong interests at stake, and the 
potential loss oflife that could result if the state is required 
to discontinue its racial segregation policy, the court may very 
well be able to conclude that there are no other effective 
means to prevent racial violence besides racial segregation. 
The case that might ultimately provide the best rationale 
for a decision declaring that racial segregation in prisons 
meets the strict scrutiny test is the infamous Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), decision. In that case, 
while purporting to apply a rigorous form ofjudicial scruti­
ny, the Court upheld the evacuation and internment of 
Japanese and Japanese Americans during World War II, even 
though the government put forth no real credible evidence 
that persons ofJapanese ancestry posed a threat to national 
security. The Court deferred to the judgment ofthe federal 
government and military officials, and given the high stakes 
involved, permitted the deprivation of civil liberties on the 
basis ofone's race or national origin. 
Thus, in Johnson, Korematsu would also justify giving some 
deference to the government, even under strict scrutiny, given 
the state's compelling goal ofpreserving prison security and of 
preventing unnecessary deaths and injury. Just as in Koremat­
su., when wartime provided exigent circumstances justifying a 
government policy of racial segregation, the always danger-
continuedon page 19 
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ous prison context similarly provides an ongoing emergency 
situation in which the threat oferuption ofracial violence may 
require deference to the state in how it decides to regulate its 
prison systems. 
While the Korematsu decision has justly been criticized for 
justifying racial paranoia and invidious racial subordination, it 
still remains good constitutional law, and even though the 
court may not cite to the case in justifying its decision, the un­
derlying principle ofKorematsu may very well be the implicit 
doctrinal basis for giving prison administrators some discre­
tion and authority to engage in racial segregation in the 
prison context. Thus, even though the Court held that strict 
judicial scrutiny is necessary to determine the constitutional­
ity ofracial segregation in prisons, there is a possibility that 
strict scrutiny ultimately may not be fatal in fact. 
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